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Abstract: 
 
In this dissertation, the need to re-conceptualize political community is explored as 
a result of the problem of environmental degradation. The concept of inevitability 
and how it informs barriers to such a re-conceptualization is pursued throughout, 
by examining its influence on understandings of political community. The potential 
to re-formulate political communities is considered in light of arguments for 
communications that facilitate a sense of community, cosmopolitan harm 
conventions, different types of learning, and most significantly, a concept of 
recognition that might provide a basis for reconsidering what political communities 
look like and how they might be organized.  
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Introduction: Re-conceptualizing political community and the problem of 
inevitability. 
  
Nothing political is inevitable. Politics is about choices and decisions, 
whether that is ‘who gets what, when and how’ (Lasswell, 1936) or some other 
formulation. There is never only one answer or one choice, though a judgment can 
be made about what is good or bad, best or worst, desirable or undesirable, and 
acceptable or unacceptable. Politics involves a multiplicity of actors, perspectives 
and interests. That being the case, it is difficult to predict likelihoods and impossible 
to determine certainties. However, once an event has happened, the choices and 
decisions that led to that outcome can be obscured, seeming natural or inevitable. 
Because something did happen, it can seem as though it was always going to 
happen. This has the effect of shaping perspectives and behaviors that can make one 
way of thinking, doing, or organizing things seems like the only option or the best 
option. This sense of inevitability, then, pervades politics and creates a barrier to 
conceptualizing alternatives.  
It is difficult to think in counter-factuals, and counter factuals may only 
represent a small number of choices conceivable because they still correspond to 
the actual outcomes. The opposite of something still reflects the thing, taking into 
account what it is in order to become what it is not. This can create a challenge to 
finding different ways to address difficulties and problems. If something or some 
way of doing things has been the answer to a particular set of questions and 
problems but a new set of questions and problems arises, the old answers may be 
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insufficient, irrelevant, or asymmetrical. Attempting to incorporate new problems 
into old solutions may prevent new solutions, and if the problem is large enough, 
threaten the old solutions as well. Thinking differently in order to find new solutions 
to new problems does not, however, necessarily mean doing the opposite of or 
jettisoning old solutions, particularly if old problems that seem to have found a 
solution would still need to be dealt with in some way if those old solutions were 
rejected or discarded. A new problem does not obviate old problems.  
Territorially located political communities are the answer to older questions 
about how we live, interact and organize ourselves optimally. They have come to 
seem natural, inevitable and desirable, particularly given the absence of alternative 
conceptualizations. What political communities are, are not, and some of what they 
could be will be explored below to see how they have been the answer to old 
questions, how this was not a given, and therefore, how they can change or adapt to 
become the answer to new questions. Benedict Anderson’s work Imagined 
Communities will be an important part of this because it shows the role political 
communities fill, illustrates some common assumptions about political communities 
and provides the tools to help challenge those assumptions. Anderson’s work alone, 
however, is inadequate to effectively challenge some of the inevitabilities associated 
with political communities that prevent refitting them to old and new purposes. For 
this, the work of Onora O’Neill and others will be drawn off of to expose the 
contingency of the seemingly inevitable and to help articulate new potentials for 
political communities. The work of Andrew Linklater and Jens Bartelson in 
particular will be used to expose the need for exploring such potential and how it 
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might be done. Rather than relying on a formulation of political community that is 
inadequate to address such new problems, a new approach to political community 
may allow us to maintain a response to old problems, and provide one for new 
problems. Ultimately, this dissertation serves as a proposal for answering new 
questions about new problems, particularly that of environmental degradation, with 
a new understanding of political communities driven by a concept of recognition, to 
be set forth below.  
 To begin, a brief overview of Anderson’s understanding of the imagined 
nature of political communities and how they spread will be provided. Before 
examining in depth how these ideas might contribute to a new approach to political 
community, an assessment of the assumptions about political communities and the 
role they play will be undertaken. Why these assumptions are problematic and 
unnecessary will be demonstrated in order to introduce different possibilities. The 
possibility of political communities based on a concept of recognition, but that may 
still account for the old form and functions of political communities will be 
presented.  
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Chapter 1: Inevitability, Interpretation and the Form of Political Communities’ 
Impact 
 
I.  Imagining Communities Large and Small: Truth-Languages, Relativization 
and Enduring Needs. 
 
In his work Imagined Communities Benedict Anderson presents an argument 
for the advent and propagation of modern nationalism. A nation, according to 
Anderson, is “[a]n imagined political community-and imagined as both inherently 
limited and sovereign (Anderson, 2006: 6).” For the purposes of this dissertation, 
the focus here is on the idea of the political community, which Anderson takes as 
being “[a] deep, horizontal comradeship (2006:7),” and different means for the 
development and organization of political communities. The imaginary quality of 
these communities rests on the idea that even though members may never know or 
have the opportunity to meet others in their community, they still have a sense of 
communion, or relationship of recognition, with them.  
Anderson’s explanation for how people come to imagine themselves as 
members of a modern, horizontal political community with others they may never 
see or know is based on what he refers to as print-capitalism. In many ways, 
language is the key to the creation and expansion of community in his work, and 
Anderson ascribes much of the development of modern political communities to the 
advent of things like books and newspapers. Knowing a common language allows 
people to share in ideas and experiences through different printed mediums. He 
traces the expansion of dynasties and empires through newspapers in particular, 
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but other printed materials such as textbooks used in schools and popular literature 
as well. Newspapers are given particular emphasis in part because of their frequent 
reinforcement of the idea that they address issues and events of interest and 
concern to a broad audience. In far-flung empires this is especially important in 
fostering a sense of community despite a lack of physical proximity. A newspaper 
can facilitate the perception that people are linked across distance and foster 
awareness of the non-local.  
There is more to say about Anderson’s arguments regarding language, media 
and how they foster community which will be addressed in more depth below, but 
the limitations, boundaries and functions of community are just as prominent in 
Anderson’s work, as well as others who grapple with the concept of political 
community. In order to more fully understand the potentialities of political 
communities, it is important to address historical forms of political community, 
changes and shifts over time, and assumptions about modern political communities.  
Anderson argues that political communities fill a need to help people make 
sense of the lives they lead and the world that they live in (2006: 10). He traces a 
shift from religiously based political communities with aspirations towards 
universality such as the Islamic Ummah, the ‘Middle Kingdom’ which we now think 
of as Chinese, and the especially that of Latin Christendom, towards smaller, 
territorialized political communities in the form of nations. The nationalized 
character of modern political communities was largely absent in these far-reaching 
communities held together by both religion and language. People may have been a 
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part of local communities with various dialects or even different languages, but, to 
focus on the example of Medieval Christendom, their overarching sense of political 
connection was derived from being Christian and having the “truth-language” of 
Latin to bind them, and it is that sense of political connection that is emphasized 
here. These communities, though much larger in scope than modern political 
communities, were still imagined through the medium of language, although 
Anderson argues the understanding of these languages is foreign to us today.  
[T]he ideograms of Chinese, Latin, or Arabic were emanations of reality, not 
randomly fabricated representations of it…There is no idea here of a world 
so separated from language that all languages are equidistant (and thus 
interchangeable) signs for it. In effect, ontological reality is apprehensible 
only through a single, privileged system of re-presentation: the truth- 
language of Church Latin, Qur’anic Arabic, or Examination Chinese. 
(Anderson, 2006: 14) 
Further, these truth-languages embedded a concept of conversion, whereby one was 
a member of the overarching community regardless of the localized aspects of their 
identity-the significance of the Englishman who becomes Pope is that he is bound 
into the community by Latin and its prestige, not by place of birth or his local 
vernacular (Anderson, 2006: 15). 
A sense of communion with others is not only about having a shared 
language, even a truth-language. While these languages were primary drivers to 
Anderson, he explains that the understanding of community was also different. 
Rather than the “horizontal, deep comradeship” mentioned above, these 
communities with pretensions to universality based on the access that truth-
languages provided also contained understandings of community that were 
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“[c]entripetal and hierarchical, rather than boundary-oriented and horizontal 
(Anderson, 2006: 15).” People could be located anywhere; it was religion, language, 
and the understanding entrenched in peoples’ consciousness, in the Christian 
example again, that “[t]he bilingual intelligentsia, by mediating between vernacular 
and Latin, mediated between earth and heaven (Anderson 2006: 15-16),” that 
bound them together in a relationship of recognition, or community.  
The power of truth-languages waned as interactions increased between 
universalizing or powerful communities. Rather than representing the truth, 
languages like Latin, Qu’aranic Arabic, and Examination Chinese began to be 
perceived as representing a truth. This relativization was slowly accompanied by 
territorialization, where the local can begin to compete with, and eventually 
supplant, the universal (Anderson, 2006: 16-18). When vernacular languages and 
religious variety gain comparable footing with formerly monopolized truths, the 
local, the particular and the contingent also gain significance.  
Obviously, the transition from truth-language, religiously based political 
communities to modern, territorially located political communities was neither as 
smooth or apparent as portrayed above, which Anderson also acknowledges (2006: 
11). That the story of the move to modern political communities was not so simple, 
and, paradoxically, not always so complicated will be addressed further below. What 
it does do, however, is first introduce the idea that there have been and there are 
other ways of conceptualizing and organizing political communities. It will be 
clarified below how the transition between the type of political community 
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examined above to modern political communities was not inevitable, but what it 
does here begins to lay the groundwork for reconsidering any sense of inevitability 
associated with the make-up of political communities. A far-reaching political 
community based on religion, “[t]he non-arbitrariness of the sign (Anderson, 2006: 
14),” and a hierarchical understanding is vastly different from a physically bounded 
and limited political community, yet both have been possible and practiced. They 
are very different, but what they have in common is the desire to answer driving 
questions about why and how things are, and to shape and understand them in 
some way. “The century of the Enlightenment…brought with it its own modern 
darkness…the suffering which belief in part composed did not disappear. 
Disintegration of paradise: nothing makes fatality more arbitrary. Absurdity of 
salvation: nothing makes another style of continuity more necessary (Anderson, 
2006: 11).” Modern political communities helped take on the role of answering 
whom and why we are, based on localities and particularities rather than universals.  
 
II. The Gage and Emblem of Freedom? The Pervasive Sense of Sovereignty’s 
Virtues. 
 
There were other reasons, of course, and apparent advantages to 
territorialized political communities, smaller in scope. A common narrative about 
the advent of the modern, sovereign state holds that they were a means to alleviate 
religious conflict that wracked Europe in the sixteenth and seventeenth century. 
With the waning of the prestige of the truth-language of Latin and a politically 
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unifying conception of Christianity, religious and political differences proliferated 
and while a hierarchical understanding of community was still pervasive, it arguably 
led to contestations among elites for positioning within that hierarchy, which was 
pursued through conflict. The impact of these conflicts was deleterious, and in order 
to curtail these consequential attempts at jockeying for position, status, and power 
the principle of cuius regio, eius religio (“Whose realm, his religion” meaning the 
religion of the ruler become the religion of those in the territory ruled) was 
enshrined in the Peace of Augsburg and other treaties (Brown, 2002: 19-37). The 
breakdown of the widespread, religious political community seemed to necessitate a 
replacement in order to mitigate conflict, and through much political maneuvering, 
negotiation, and battle the sovereign state became that replacement. How accurate 
this narrative is and an alternative explanation will be explored below, but first 
some of the impacts of this narrative need to be considered.  
There are a couple of potential problems and questions that arise here. The 
first is whether or not political communities are coterminous with sovereign states, 
the inherent euro-centrism if such a conclusion is reached and the impacts of that, 
and whether or not such conclusions would be desirable. In international relations 
theory, political communities are not automatically coterminous with sovereign 
states, but they are closely aligned concepts and where they are not coterminous 
with an extant sovereign state, they often aspire to become one. Anderson’s political 
community is the nation, and from his definition of the nation as limited and 
sovereign, the alignment between nations and states is clear. This is because for 
Anderson “[t]he gage and emblem of this freedom is the sovereign state (2006: 7),” 
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this freedom being religious and territorial freedom that sovereign states 
supposedly enshrined at the end of the wars of religion. Where his nations are not 
states, they fight to be.  
Jens Bartleson articulates that what conceptions of political community have 
in common in political theory is that protection of understandings and pursuit of the 
good and particularities is provided for and can be defended against outside 
interference and imposition (Bartelson, 2009: 7). Bartelson argues that the 
multiplicity of variations on community make the term ambiguous and clear 
definitions limit inquiry into community and its potential.  While his point is well 
taken, and a strict, independent definition of political community outside of those 
put forth by authors such as Anderson is avoided to maintain such an open inquiry 
into conceptual possibilities, what Bartelson reveals supports the idea of an 
assumption of the desirability of sovereignty in political theory regarding particular, 
localized political communities. Regardless of variations, modern political 
communities assume boundaries and their necessity because these lines of 
demarcation allow outside intrusion to be rejected with a claim to legitimacy. That 
claim rests on the practice and history of sovereignty as the means to guarantee 
freedom within boundaries and borders. Current conceptualizations of political 
community, then, may not explicitly identify with states, but the desire to have the 
presumed protection of sovereignty that states at least theoretically enjoy is 
implicit. Sometimes, the linkages between political community and states are much 
more evident. In Transformation of Political Community, Andrew Linklater, even 
while arguing for the need to move beyond states derived from the supposed 
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Westphalian order, is primarily concerned with confronting political communities in 
the form of states (1998: 1-3).  Furthermore, apart from the discussion of the 
possibilities and desirability of a dialogic community, Linklater is careful to preserve 
much of the rationale and force of sovereignty in dealings between different peoples 
and communities.  
The principle that no one has the right to purchase autonomy by reducing the 
autonomy of others can be embedded in the project…which addresses the 
concerns of individuals and minorities and not merely, interest of the nation-
states. Societies which take this conviction seriously are bound to be 
troubled by the ways in which they export harm to outsiders or secure their 
own identity by demeaning or misrepresenting other cultures. (Linklater, 
1998: 219) 
Autonomy within boundaries and freedom from outside interference are key 
advantages of sovereign political states in theory, and while Linklater is dedicated to 
more inclusive, just forms of community, the appeal of a concept of sovereignty still 
exists in terms of securing freedoms to be different, and to limit exposure from 
external injury. Even where a desire for political community different from the 
limitations of sovereign states exists, there still tends to be a level of 
correspondence between political community and sovereign states in modern 
approaches.  
 If prevailing conceptions of political community are so closely aligned with 
the idea of sovereign states, to the point where even calls for reform or 
transformation would incorporate primary components of the sovereign state, one 
begins to question where these ideas come from and what they might mean for 
those outside of the ideas’ origins. As discussed above, the sovereign state became 
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an answer to the conflicts in Europe during the sixteenth and seventeenth century 
following the gradual disintegration at a more broadly conceived political 
community based on religion and language. The origins of this form of political 
community are particular to Europe, and that origin has had a decided influence as 
the form has been exported or adopted elsewhere.  
III. Is it Differences that Makes us Strangers? Power Vacuums, Periodization, 
and the Perfect Problem for a Suspect Solution. 
  
Reference was made above to a Westphalian order, shorthand for the 
supposed advent of the modern states system. Although authors such as Daniel 
Philpott (2001), Benno Teschke (2009), and Bartelson (1995) have done much to 
illuminate the problematic narrative of the 1648 Peace of Westphalia and modern 
sovereign states and expose a much more complicated picture, the division between 
the medieval and the modern is still bound up with the arrival and predominance of 
sovereign states. This division between the medieval past and modern present has 
had severe political consequences and poses a challenge to attempts to reconfigure 
political communities. As noted above, modern sovereign states were an answer to 
the problems supposedly resulting from widespread conflicts driven by religious 
and political differences that became more prominent as the attempted monopoly 
on truth became relativized and the foundations of a more broadly based political 
community were compromised. One of the issues here is that politicized historical 
narration has propagated the idea that modern sovereign states were the answer, 
rather than a choice amongst others. This both confers legitimacy and sustains it for 
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sovereign states, and creates a barrier to conceptualizing alternatives, even where 
they might be necessary. The way that this barrier was established and has been 
maintained is twofold: by exploiting and entrenching suspicion of difference and by 
imbuing modern sovereign states with inevitability through politicized 
historiography.  
 In The Problem of Difference, Naeem Inyatullah and David Blaney argue that 
“[r]eason dictates sovereignty as a spatial solution to the problem of moral and 
religious uncertainty; power is spatialized in the state, thereby transforming a 
dangerous diversity of individual opinions and wills into a sovereign opinion and 
will (2004:36).” Although sovereign states have been viewed as the means to 
address the religious and political differences that led to conflict, they can be viewed 
rather as deferring, denying, and suppressing difference. Differences themselves are 
not negative or positive, it is only through interpretation and interpretation of the 
impact of those differences that they become negatives or positives. Sovereign 
states were touted as the solution to a constructed problem, where differences were 
perceived and acted upon as negatives. This solution aligned with actors interested 
in consolidating their political power by transforming control of a territory into 
political and religious supremacy. Arguably, the desire for the solution may have 
preceded the problem of difference. The advantages of sovereignty for de jure equals 
are clear-cut: internal autonomy, theoretically with the threat of outside 
interference and external reprisal removed. In fact, an examination of the historical 
foundations of the modern sovereign state suggests that a problem was created to 
fit a solution. This interpretation is argued below.  
 19 
 Sovereign states were touted as the means to escape a medieval past 
characterized by an oppressive, feudal hierarchy where peoples political and 
religious differences drove them to conflict. As noted above, there is a gap where 
Anderson’s explanation of the end of a universalized political community based on 
the Latin truth-language and religion and where modern sovereign states begin.  As 
Anderson’s political community waned and the contingencies of location, vernacular 
languages and religious differences took on significance, jockeying for position and 
power became more intense between political actors, and difference was a premise 
for conflict, which was itself a means to establish territorial controls. What was at 
work was a power vacuum created by the end of a hierarchical, centripetal, 
universalized conception of community, rather than manifestations of that 
conception.  
However, political moves made by sixteenth and seventeenth century jurists 
helped to create an understanding of the past wherein feudalism was an oppressive 
organizing system for society based on fiefs and vassalage in which land was held by 
nobility in exchange for military service and those that lived and worked on that 
land were bound to it through complex systems of stake-holding and homage 
(Reynolds, 1996: 6). Medieval historians reject this characterization of the medieval 
period as an attempt to “[o]rganize the past and provide arguments for the present 
so that ideas about it gradually spread to the public (Reynolds, 1996: 7).” Fedualism 
was not medieval society’s structure and in surviving medieval documents 
references to fiefs and vassalage are limited to academic laws of fiefs (Reynolds, 
1996: 4). What, then, was the reason and origin for this pervasive narrative about 
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Europe’s past? In Periodization and Sovereignty, Kathleen Davis argues that the 
creation of a feudal European past was meant to substitute as a foundation or 
location for sovereignty (2008: 6). The need for this substitution arose as a result of 
the “sovereign paradox” where the sovereign is “[h]e who decides the exception 
(Schmitt, 1988: 5),” both inside and outside the law. In a legal foundation, there can 
be no location of sovereignty because the potential for a ‘state of exception’ where a 
state’s own legal order and norms might threaten the existence of the state, and 
where the sovereign must be empowered to decide on the suspension of the legal 
order to protect the state in the event that he recognizes such an exception (Davis, 
2008: 14). The tenuous solution to this problem created through the politicized 
historical interpretations of jurists such as Hotman and De Moulin was to make the 
rejection of feudal relations the basis and justification of sovereignty (Davis, 2008: 
25).  
As an “-ism,” feudalism of course suggests a fully reified object, a status that 
accords with the belief that it is (or ought to be) a phenomenon of the past. 
We should not be surprised, however, to find that “feudalism” emerged with 
the decapitating stroke: first nominalized as feodalite on the eve of the 
French Revolution, it was brought to adjudicate between nobility, 
parliament, and crown, particularly in matters of property, and ultimately to 
embody the superstitious and fettered past being dragged to the guillotine. In 
this sense, “feudalism” is one of our most graphic examples of Walter 
Benjamin’s insight that “modernity” simultaneously produced and destroyed 
the images of tradition to which it opposed itself. (Davis, 2008: 7) 
The location, definition and possession of sovereignty was a source of conflict and 
struggle, and a feudalism that never was helped to both create and demolish the 
history necessary to justify the sovereign state. History is not simply a matter of 
recording a series of facts and events; it is a political, interpretive act. The choices 
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that are made about what to include and exclude, how things are framed, who is the 
audience and what are the subjects will have an impact on both audience and 
subject. Authors of history are influenced by their own histories, and the choices 
that they make in terms of subjects and language also affect history’s interpretation 
(White, 1989: 128-129). When these decisions are denied or disguised by claiming 
to present only the facts of how things were or are, contingent interpretations can 
be taken as innocent explanation. (White, 1982: 123). The history as political act 
outlined above has not been innocent.  
The ramifications of this historical construction have been extensive. Above 
it was mentioned that politicized history created a barrier to conceptualizing 
alternative political forms. This is because this image of the feudal past was brought 
into life to be destroyed. To demonstrate that the new was positive, it was seemingly 
necessary that the “old” be negative, but while the division between the medieval 
and the modern was constructed in service of political actors who wanted the 
advantages of sovereignty, that division’s effects were not limited to that effect. The 
“medieval” is not simply in the past. Sovereignty, the social contract and subjection 
were theorized based off of the lord and vassal of feudal relations, which allowed 
theorists such as Jean Bodin to argue for absolutism by keeping the social contract, 
but jettisoning what was “feudal” because it was associated with slavery, 
subjugation and property.  
At the very moment the colonial slave trade began to soar, in other 
words, feudal law and slavery were grouped together and identified 
as characteristic of Europe’s past and a non-European present. To this 
history we owe the later, persistent association of the Middle Ages 
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with subjugation, as well as the role of the Middle Ages as the enabling 
figure of exclusion in much philosophical and political thought. (Davis, 
2008:24) 
To be “medieval” is to be oppressive, irrational, brutal and regressive, and it is not a 
label limited to the past but applied to some in the present. People are cast out of 
history by this ‘denial of coevalness’ (Fabian, 1983). Pre-modernity is where 
oppression and slavery belong, and where these practices exist contemporaneously 
people are “[b]anned from the story and relegated to the past (Buck-Morss 2002: 
850).” When something is labeled as medieval, it enables it to be ignored and 
excluded from the world. “With the conversion of space into time, the constructed 
temporal backwardness of the savage is equated with the imagined temporal origins 
of the European self…the spatially distant other is thereby converted into a 
temporally prior self (Inanyatullah and Blaney, 2004:56).” The division between 
medieval and modern still acts as an exclusionary force. People are denied access to 
modernity and its advantages, which prevents them from engaging with the 
modern, powerful and makes them more susceptible to subjugation and exploitation 
because they do not count in the present narrative. The medieval “[i]s a mobile 
category, applicable at any time to any society that has not “yet” achieved modernity 
or, worse, has become retrograde (Davis, 2008: 5).” Labeling someone or some 
group as medieval is an exclusionary move and it can be oppressive for “[C]an the 
designation of something or some group as non or premodern ever be anything but 
a gesture of the powerful (Chakrabarty, 2002: xi-xx)?”  
It is also a move that can invalidate difference, which, along with excluding 
people, curtails explorations of alternatives modes of doing, being, or organizing. 
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This makes it difficult to re-conceptualize political forms or political communities 
because: 
[B]y providing a singular point of departure, a global “medieval” past anchors 
this homogenization of cultural forms. More specifically, this singularized 
point of departure validates the global application of narrowly conceived 
definitions of political forms-such as modern democracy, feudal (or “rogue) 
states, and “secular” government-the limits of which have been formulated 
through the periodization of the medieval and the modern. (Davis, 2008: 5) 
This is a problem that it is necessary to expose, acknowledge and confront in order 
to begin seriously investigating new potential formulations of political community, 
particular if those political communities might be in more just relation to each other.  
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Chapter Two: Transnational Problems and the Need for Change 
I. Environmental Degradation and the Prospect of Politics’ Erosion  
 The question then becomes why this blockade against difference and 
different political forms matters even beyond questions of just treatment, 
consideration, and inclusion of others in the present. While it may not be palatable, 
an argument could be made that even if the politicized historiography of the modern 
sovereign states invalidates difference and limits the possibilities for re-
conceptualizing political forms and communities, the order it has helped establish 
has more benefits than harms. Some would argue that even if an order is unjust, 
order must be maintained for justice to ever be possible (Bull, 1977: 83). Questions 
of justice are significant in terms of the rationale for re-conceptualizing political 
communities and will be dealt with further below, but the problem created by the 
barrier to considering or pursuing alternatives is in large part one of the adequacy 
and efficacy of the status quo political form and community to address challenges 
that people and their communities face. Modern sovereign states once supposedly 
mitigated the problem of conflict over differences, and even though this narrative 
was interrogated above, they have sustained a claim to having the logically 
necessary attributes to respond to the problems of difference in an anarchical 
international system. This may or may not be true, but what matters is whether or 
not they are also capable of meeting challenges of global concern.  
Disease, terrorism, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction are 
issues with broad ranging impacts that may affect people regardless of their 
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territorial location, and, more importantly, regardless of what role they have had in 
bringing these problems about. Their consequences have been uneven or 
unrealized, but particularly in the case of weapons of mass destruction, their 
potential to impact people regardless of the states that they belong to and the clear 
limitations of states to address such transnational problems have elicited calls and 
efforts to re-consider what political community should look like: 
[w]hat is needed in order to save the world from self-destruction is not the 
limitation of the exercise of national sovereignty through international 
obligations and institutions, but the transference of the sovereignties of 
individual states to a world authority, which would be as sovereign over the 
individual nations as the individual nations are sovereign within their 
respective territories" ; that because "reforms within the international 
society have failed and were bound to fail," there must be a "radical 
transformation of the existing international society of sovereign nations into 
a supra- national community of individuals (Morgenthau in Speer, 1968: 
212) 
 
Precisely because sovereignty secures internal, territorial autonomy it poses a 
challenge to the cooperation necessary to confront transnational issues effectively. 
Unless all states agree to cooperate to resolve a problem, even if it means 
compromising their sovereignty, the potential for either conflict or problems going 
unaddressed and unresolved is high. That a transference of sovereignty such as 
Morgenthau discussed above would be extremely onerous and likely to cause or be 
brought about only by severe conflict has been frequently acknowledged, and that is 
a dilemma explored below.  First, however, a transnational problem that may have 
the force to realize a reconsideration of the structures and logic of modern political 
communities needs to be introduced.  
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The transnational problem of environmental degradation is strengthening 
the urgency of calls to reconsider how we approach political community and it is an 
issue that has the potential to drive change. Environmental degradation is, indeed, 
the transnational problem par excellence. It embodies the longstanding concerns of 
international relations theorists preoccupied with questions of harm, justice, duty, 
time, space, development, and globalization, among others. Bound up in the problem 
of environmental degradations are issues of security, ethics, morality, and survival.  
While some such as Ronald Ingelhart (1986) have argued that growing 
concern with the environment is the result of a shift in values regarding materialism 
that has developed since 1945, or that, as argued by people such as Stephen 
Cotgrove and Andrew Duff (1980), that it is the result of a newer, large class of 
people that are removed from the values and experience of industrial production 
(1980: 340-3410), the consensus amongst the world’s climate change scientists, 
captured by the reports and efforts of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC), and governments is that climate change and environmental 
degradation is a genuine, multi-faceted, globalized problem (Garner, 2011: 26-27). 
Air and water pollution, ozone depletion, diminished biodiversity, resource scarcity, 
catastrophic weather, rising sea levels are just some of the problems associated with 
environmental degradation, the impacts of which are felt in different ways in 
different places, but have interconnected causes, where local manifestations cannot 
be disentangled from global factors (Garner, 2011: 3). Environmental degradation 
poses risks and challenges to health and sustainability, and authors such as Simon 
Dalby (2010), Jon Barnett (2001), and others have assessed and approached the 
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problem as a security challenge, with the potential for conflicts over resources. 
Despite growing consensus that environmental degradation is increasingly a 
problem, political action and will have not been found to effectively or sustainably 
address or attempt to alleviate it. Solutions have been focused on developing 
international agreements and reforming institution within the current political 
framework. Treaties and agreements are unimplemented, and continuous meetings 
and summits have been inconclusive, with minimal results (Annan, 2002; Chasek, 
2000). 
This lack of political will and effective action can be interpreted partially as 
the result of a form of political community organized on the principle of territorially 
bounded sovereignty. Because the emphasis and onus of political solutions to 
problems falls on a form of political community that is characterized by a focus on 
internal autonomy, separateness, and particularized interests, the practices and 
tools of cooperation and broad-scale thinking that a transnational problem such as 
environmental degradation requires are weak or lacking. If reform that would allow 
dedicated cooperation and attention to environmental degradation is possible, it 
would also need to be significant and far-reaching.  
The reason that this matters is that if the environmental consequences of the 
problems mentioned above are not addressed and become increasingly severe, they 
will erode the grounds for politics. Without the conditions necessary to life or 
survival, politics cannot be conducted, and even if the prospect is not complete 
devastation and extinction of life, the worse the conditions, the worse the prospects 
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for politics not driven by fear and desperation. Whatever the interests of different 
political communities may be, they are undermined by the prospect of severe 
environmental degradation; anything dependent on the conditions necessary for 
survival becomes secondary in the event that those conditions are destroyed or 
deteriorate substantially.  
There is dissension amongst scientists and observers about when 
catastrophic environmental degradation might occur (Garner 2011: 10-123), but 
even the prospect may be enough to galvanize change before widespread 
catastrophe. A pessimistic view might hold that people can only be brought together 
in cooperation as the result of catastrophe, but below it will be argued that the 
political capabilities and resources exist to effect changes required to adequately 
confront the challenge of environmental degradation before disaster, and without 
widespread conflict. Questioning the moral relevance of physical boundaries and the 
role of harm are the first part of unlocking that potential.  
 
II. A Small World, After All: Distance, Interaction and Harm 
  
Within normative international relations theory, the idea that because people 
have the ability to impact each other even across great distances they cannot be 
limited by the physical boundaries of their communities in recognizing their 
relationships with others has a long, if uneven pedigree. Charles Beitz was among 
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the first and most prominent to bring forward the notion that “[i]f evidence of global 
economic and political interdependence shows the existence of a global scheme of 
social cooperation, we should not view national boundaries as having fundamental 
moral significance. Since boundaries are not coextensive with the scope of social 
cooperation, they do not mark the limits of social obligations (1979: 151),” although 
he was not alone. Increasing globalization and, more importantly, increasing 
awareness of globalization made the questions of the obligations that exist in 
interactions across distance persistent at least within normative theory.  
 For theorists such as Onora O’Neill, physical borders need never have been 
invested with weighty moral significance not only because our ability to impact each 
other across distances, though that is important, but also because of we are not so 
limited in our ability to conceive of ourselves in relationships with others. People 
have multiple overlapping identities and communities that they can belong to 
(O’Neill 2000a: 121). People are capable of being more than one thing; they can be 
parents, children, siblings, friends, colleagues, and citizens amongst other roles  
simultaneously, suggesting that they are not so limited in their ability to conceive of 
themselves in relation to others that their identities must or can be contained within 
rigid boundaries. This capacity is related to Anderson’s argument above about 
people’s ability to imagine themselves as a part of communities with people they 
have never and will never meet; O’Neill introduces the idea that communities can 
also overlap, which will be taken further below.  
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 That people are capable of thinking of themselves as more than one thing and 
acting in more than one role is one component of formulating what relations are and 
could be between people across distances, but the more pressing need to consider 
these relations is driven by the impact that people can have on each other, 
regardless of location. Moral standing, or “[o]ur commitment to who counts 
(Erskine, 2008: 15),” is a frequent consideration. What moral standing we grant to 
others is increasingly more than a matter of convenience, an afterthought, or the 
preserve of those primarily concerned with issues of justice, though that is never far 
from questions of moral standing.  
A practical approach to moral standing has strong implications for action for 
anyone who does not live the hermit life. We live with and by the complex 
interlock of agents which global trade, communications and densely 
connected institutions have produced…We do not and cannot coherently 
deny the agency of those whose nuclear weapons or debt repudiation or 
habits of pollution and environmental degradation we fear…We do not and 
cannot consistently deny the agency of those whose peaceful coexistence, 
economic sobriety and environmental responsibility we hope to rely 
upon…[w]e begin to premise our actions, plans and policies on there being 
agents and subjects. When we do this…we are committed to ascribing to 
them the same moral standing that we ascribe to nearby and familiar others 
in whom we assume like capacities. (O’Neill, 2000d: 196-197) 
Interconnectedness brings us into relationships of reliance whether we desire them 
too or not. The frequency, depth, and significance of interactions with others brings 
us to rely on certain conditions and behavior as far as possible, and we predicate 
our actions accordingly. The idea of granting moral standing to others in closely 
linked to recognition which will be discussed in greater depth, and it is also tied to 
the problem of harm, which will help to illustrate further aspects of the potential for 
change in political community needed to confront transnational challenges. 
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 Andrew Linklater is perhaps the most prominent theorist in International 
Relations on the subject of harm. Harm is a “[p]art of the universal grammar of 
social life (Linklater, 2011: 6),” that all societies and communities must find a way to 
grapple with as it is an issue that constantly arises in relations between people. 
Because of increasing interactions, harm between and across community 
boundaries must be addressed (Linklater, 2011: 221-222). The core premise of 
harm for Linklater is that, in a variety of ways, we can and do damage or harm each 
other. Although the concept of harm covers an extensive range, from non-violent to 
violent forms and Linklater admits that understandings of harm can vary between 
different people (2011: 41-42), there is a need to develop conventions about harm 
to mitigate its consequences and impact. Consequences of issues that affect people 
across distance such as exploitative economic arrangements or environmental 
damage require greater means and resources to control or reduce them, or the 
““[m]oral and political resources with which to adapt to the increasing challenge of 
how to control global processes in ways that respect economic, cultural and political 
rights of every member of the human race (Linklater, 2007b: 123).” 
 Harm conventions for Linklater are both international and cosmopolitan, 
with international harm conventions developing around ideas such as sovereignty 
and non-intervention in order to support international order; as such international 
harm conventions are often silent on forms of harm that might lead to individual or 
group suffering, because they prioritize international order and tend to focus on the 
unit level of states in the international system. Cosmopolitan harm conventions, 
alternatively, would emphasize world order rather than simply international order, 
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meaning that the treatment of individuals and groups, and the harm inflicted upon 
them from sources such as states, structures, processes, and other groups and 
people, would be a matter of concern and attention (Linklater, 2011: 36-37). 
International harm conventions, as noted above, already exist with some force as a 
means to order relations between actors, primarily states. This includes rules 
governing things like the use of force and warfare, and conventions on the treatment 
of prisoners. However, international harm conventions do not go far enough, and 
may create a barrier to establishing more robust harm conventions in relation to 
transnational issues, because international harms conventions limit focus and 
resources to an international order composed of units that are not equipped to 
address such issues, as argued above, and may exacerbate them.  
Cosmopolitan conventions are essential because of the negative 
consequences of unusually high levels of human interconnectedness, 
specifically the ability to project military power into the heartland of distant 
societies and the increased possibility of transnational harm in recent 
decades. Environmental degradation is a striking contemporary example of 
transnational harm that travels freely across borders, giving rise to a new 
moral and political vocabulary, and to limited global harm conventions, that 
are concerned not with ‘national interests’ or international order but with 
the well-being of the species and the fate of future generations. (Linklater, 
2011: 37) 
International harm conventions are insufficient to meet the problems of 
transnational harm. Cosmopolitan conventions against harm are a part of the means 
necessary to confront transnational problems such as environmental degradation, 
and part of their development may be found in extending some of Anderson’s 
arguments outlined above. 
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 As noted, Anderson considers newspapers and other forms of print and 
media to be a significant part of imaging ourselves in relation with others. We can be 
connected without face-to-face interactions by using language and media to learn 
about, understand and empathize with others across distance. Globalized 
communication technologies make it increasingly difficult to avoid awareness of the 
impact of transnational harm, and might encourage accountability for that harm: 
Images of distant suffering bring the plight of distant strangers closer to the 
lives of the affluent; stark evidence of global inequalities makes it hard to 
deny that many can relieve distress with little cost to themselves; visual 
representations of suffering dramatize the ways in which the most powerful 
societies can harm the vulnerable, whether as a result of their stranglehold 
on global institutions that are biased towards their economic and political 
interests, or because of military operations in foreign places, and so forth 
(Linklater, 2011: 226). 
 
For anyone swayed by images or media that call attention to the impact of harm as 
the result of structures and interactions, the need for cosmopolitan harm 
conventions may seem both obvious and easily in reach through a promotion of 
further awareness, calls for action, and efforts to establish such conventions. 
However, widespread implementation of cosmopolitan harm conventions faces 
several significant difficulties, may not be possible as a result of the current form 
and conceptualization of political communities in close correspondence with 
sovereign states, and is a slow moving process. The most prominent of the 
difficulties associated with enacting effective cosmopolitan harm conventions have 
to do with the tension associated with cosmopolitan thought and its apparent 
inability to drive extensive change.  These difficulties will now be assessed in order 
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to help establish a potential foundation for resolving them, and helping to push 
forward cosmopolitan harm conventions and the re-conceptualization of political 
community required to do so. 
 
III. Communitarianism, Cosmopolitanism and Learning What Moves 
 
 In his work International Relations Theory: New Normative Approaches Chris 
Brown argues that international relations theory can be broadly divided between 
communitarian and cosmopolitan thought.  Where “[T]he root notion of 
communitarian thought is that value stems from the community, that the individual 
finds meaning in life by virtue of his or her membership of a political community 
(1992: 55), “ whereas “[W]hat is crucial to a cosmopolitan attitude is the refusal to 
regard existing political structures as the source of ultimate value (1992: 24).” The 
cosmopolitan attitude relates directly to questioning the moral relevance of 
boundaries discussed above, as well as the issue of moral standing granted to 
others. There is no socially prior self for communitarians (Brown 1992: 59), and 
what a more cosmopolitan thinker might consider to be contingencies of identities, 
political structures and communities, are integral for communitarians because 
without those layers of contingency, “[t]here is no ‘self’ left (Erskine, 2002: 459).”  
 The starkness of the division between cosmopolitan and communitarian 
positions vary. While a broadly cosmopolitan thinker might hold that there are “[n]o 
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compelling reasons for preferring the interests of co-nationals to the interests of 
foreigners (Linklater, 2007: 116), they might still recognize utility of bounded 
communities, and indeed some people who adopt a communitarian position may do 
so because they believe that by using communities to secure their own needs, 
people might then be more willing to look to the care of others, and that there are 
practical limitations to caring for others across great distances. Attempts have also 
been made to combine the supposed value of bounded communities with 
cosmopolitan concerns, such as with Toni Erskine’s idea of ‘Embedded 
Cosmopolitanism, ‘ which accepts “[t]he strength and tenacity of particular ties, as 
well as the existence of separate communities, nations, and states, and to construct 
an ethical framework that recognizes value as constituted by, but not bounded 
within these associations (2008: 40).” This approach avoids treating particularity as 
unimportant contingency, and supposes that because, drawing off of O’Neill’s ideas 
referred to above, identities and belonging to communities can overlap, it is possible 
to develop more inclusive relationships with others by finding commonalities with 
others beyond physical borders. Erskine argues that this overlap concerns our 
ability to grant equal moral standing across boundaries where “[O]ne’s sphere of 
equal moral standing, understood as informed by shared membership within 
multifarious and overlapping morally constitutive communities, has the potential to 
be inclusive in scope (2008: 175), although some identities may be too different or 
incompatible to form inclusive bonds and overlap (Erskine 2008: 177-178). For 
someone such as Bartelson, this formulation of embedded cosmopolitanism would 
be problematic in terms of genuinely establishing inclusive forms of community 
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because it still relies on the premise that communities, no matter how much they 
are able to overlap, must be bounded (2009: 19). This is a problem of seeming 
inevitability discussed above, where our conception of what community means is 
fundamentally premised on some idea that seems natural and inevitable, but that 
with a different cosmology or understanding of the world may not be.  
 Re-thinking this premise about community is important to unlocking the 
potential of political community so that it might be better able to address 
transnational issues. Some communitarian thinkers hold that without bounded 
communities in which people identify more strongly with members of their 
community than those outside of their community they “[w]ould have no reason to 
be moral (MacIntyre, 1995: 217).” However, even if the contingencies of our identity 
are important in giving us a sense of self and helping us enter into relationships with 
each other based on commonalities, moving away from the supposedly more 
realistic approach of communitarianism and focusing on that which makes us the 
same rather than what makes us different is an important step to establishing 
different ideas of community.  
But if our moral values do not derive from the particular communities we 
happen to inhabit, but rather from our ability to share meaningful 
experiences in common with other people, then such values would stand an 
equal chance of evolving irrespective of the existence of boundaries between 
the people doing the sharing…the seeds of human community are sown the 
moment human beings enter into intercourse with each other, not the 
moment they decide to settle down together within the same 
territory…boundaries are therefore arbitrary restrictions on such 
intercourse, and on those very practices of sharing that are constitutive of 
the possibility of human community. (Bartelson, 2009: 178).  
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Questioning the inevitability of what political communities must look like, and that 
they must be comprised of boundaries and borders invested with moral relevance is 
necessary to unlock the possibility of doing things differently, and in a way that 
might allow better means to combat a problem such as environmental degradation.  
According to what has become a widespread assumption within the social 
sciences, the identity of a given political community requires it to be different 
from other communities of the same kind. Sameness presupposed otherness, 
and identity presupposes difference. Consequently, particular communities 
derive their identity from a game of recognition that takes place between 
them during their formative phases, in which case their ‘identities and their 
corresponding interests are learned and then reinforced in response to how 
actors are treated by significant Others.’ But as long as we regard this logic of 
identity as a predominant source of human belonging and identification, the 
formation of a community of all mankind will look highly unlikely simply 
because there are no human Others left that would provide that sense of 
sameness (Bartelson, 2009: 43).  
This is not to suggest that communities do not or should not matter, or that identity 
does not or should not matter, but that how identity is used in constructing 
communities needs to be seriously interrogated. Our sameness does not have to 
derive from our differences with others, it could derive from our sameness in spite 
of a multiplicity of differences-we may not all be similar, but because we are human 
we are the same. As argued above, the negativity of difference is the result of 
interpretation and a calculated political interest in division to allow multiple actors 
access to power. Difference as a problem is not inevitable.  
 At this point, however, it is important to acknowledge that the argument 
above does not have enough force to be compelling to communitarians, or most 
beyond dedicated cosmopolitans. This lack of persuasive power has been identified 
by theorists such as Andrew Dobson, who argues that cosmopolitan positions that 
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call for extending recognition or moral standing equally to all person by virtue of 
their sameness and regardless of their differences lack motivational capacity (2006: 
165). The argument does not move most people to act or change their behavior and 
perceptions. Under present conditions, it may be impossible to extend recognition 
to all persons in a way that makes political community based on equal moral 
standing and consideration, or fundamental human sameness, possible. There may, 
however, be a way to move forward in such a way that the prospect for such a re-
conceptualization does become possible. Part of this involves the coincidence of 
learning of different types, which will be examined immediately below, and part 
concerns an exploration of recognition and the articulation of a different type of 
recognition that might facilitate change and grow that change through practice, 
which is the subject of the final chapter.  
 In Linklater’s work there are two significant forms of learning that he has 
drawn from Jurgen Habermas and others, which are strategic and moral-social 
learning. Strategic learning is that learning in which “[s]ocieties have mastered 
more destructive technologies for the purposes of outmaneuvering, controlling and 
defeating adversaries (Linklater, 2011: 252).” On face, this type of learning is a 
negative form that, if unchecked, can lead to conflict and destruction. Moral-social 
learning involves thinking from the standpoint of others, which is a process that has 
the potential to “[i]mprove the human prospect of reaching agreements about how 
to co-exist with minimum harm (2011:251).” These two forms of learning are 
presented as being in a sort of competition with each other, and historically the 
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division between the two has also been a division between a more cosmopolitan 
orientation and that of a more pessimistic outlook: 
It is essential to stress that forms of social learning that have led to larger 
territorial monopolies of power that can cause immense harm over greater 
distances express species-powers that are distinctive as the ability to widen 
the scope of emotional identification to include all humans…the fact that 
revolutions in inventing new ways of causing harm have often had the upper 
hand should not obscure the part that moral learning plays in maintaining 
the hope that modern societies and their descendants are not condemned to 
forevermore to live with the patterns of the past. (Linklater 2011: 253). 
The division between the two types of learning here is clear, and that hope has 
rested in moral learning to outpace strategic learning drives the hope that thinkers 
such as Kant have had that the damages caused by strategic learning are not 
inevitable or destined to determine the future. This division makes a great deal of 
sense, particularly as it relates to the past, but another reading of the potential 
relationship between strategic and moral learning is possible. Rather that the two 
forms of learning remaining in competition with each other, where moral learning 
hopes to outstrip strategic learning at some point to improve prospects for the 
future, a problem such as environmental degradation may be able to fuse the forms 
together, or at least have them work in tandem with each other, instead of in 
conflict. Strategic learning is about mastering the ability to defeat adversaries to 
advance interests, so theoretically that learning could be channeled to defeat an 
adversary that poses a clear threat to interests, even if the adversary is not another, 
specific group of people. As environmental degradation advances, through moral 
learning, or seeing from the standpoint of others, the interconnectedness of the 
problem may become clearer, and people may learn that no one group of people or 
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actors has caused the entire problem, and that the solution involves massive, wide-
ranging cooperation on a variety of fronts, in different forms. The threat to the 
conditions of life that allow actors to pursue interests might create a non-
adversarial or less adversarial relationship between the two types of learning, if 
strategic learning can be harnessed to destroy the problem, and it is focused on 
conditions and structures, rather than people. Such a coincidence of the two types of 
learning might sound optimistic at first glance, however, part of strategic learning in 
light of a problem of environmental degradation is likely to be that groups are 
inflicting the problem on themselves and others, and to secure interests and 
survival strategic learners may turn that knowledge that we interact and effect each 
other into a means of controlling others. If moral learners can take practical steps to 
try and direct strategic learning towards cooperation to address the problem that 
threatens its interests, rather than moral learning that allows us to see from the 
standpoint of others to be co-opted to subjugate people as a means of alleviating the 
problem of environmental degradation, there is some hope for a positive 
relationship between the two types of learning. Strategic learning may have done 
much to cause the harm of environmental degradation, but it will not stop as a result 
of that harm; rather, it is likely turn itself to defeating the threat of its creation. How 
this happens is an open question, but an active attempt for moral learning not to 
outstrip strategic learning in relation to environmental degradation, but to fuse with 
it is preferable. At a certain point, how a problem came about matters less than how 
it will be dealt with, and guiding the destructive tendencies of our strategic learning 
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capabilities with our moral learning capabilities advances and protects interests on 
both sides of the learning divide.   
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Chapter 3: What Might We Learn 
I. Recognition, From People to Means 
  
Recognition plays a role in the moral-social learning addressed above, and 
may be a part of the practical steps to fuse the two forms of learning. How and why 
this might be the case involves a more in depth discussion of recognition, as well as 
a somewhat novel approach to the concept. Below it will be argued that recognition 
exists at three stages, with the first stage of recognition as identification being a 
constant of all types of recognition, the second stage of recognition as 
acknowledgement representing a continuum, and the third stage of recognition as 
appreciation. What this entails will be detailed below, as well as its limitations and 
how those limitations might be circumvented in the service of the wider argument 
here about the potential for a re-conceptualization of political community to address 
a transnational problem like environmental degradation.  
Theorists such as Axel Honneth who have concerned themselves with the 
concept of recognition have emphasized recognition as a form of acknowledgement 
(Honneth, 1995: viii). Acknowledgement is an integral part of recognition, but it will 
be argued that there is more to the concept that acknowledgment, and that the 
degree of acknowledgement differs substantially in different cases. As stated above, 
the concept of recognition employed here comes in three stages because recognition 
conveys a variety of related meanings depending on context and usage or 
performance. Recognition begins with simple identification or consciousness of 
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someone or some thing, which is the first stage. In this first stage of identification, 
recognition simply demonstrates consciousness or awareness of an idea, person, 
structure, situation or problem. This seems very basic, but it is a necessary part of 
reaching the second stage of recognition, acknowledgement. Acknowledgement is a 
far more political form of recognition, and it introduces judgment into the concept 
because it concerns evaluating both the existence and validity (or lack thereof) of 
the object of recognition. Unlike in the first stage, this type of recognition moves 
beyond simply being aware of the existence or non-existence of something, because 
one can be aware of something but still refuse to acknowledge it. Recognition as 
identification is a nearly inescapable aspect of recognition because it does not 
require sustained effort to merely be conscious of something, but recognition as 
acknowledgment requires far more. To recognize in the sense of acknowledgement 
requires that a decision be made to reject or accept whatever the object of 
recognition. In these stages of recognition, while it would not be possible to 
acknowledge something without first identifying it, it is possible to identify 
something but refuse to acknowledge it. For example, a person might be aware or 
conscious of the presence of another person that they dislike, but whether or not to 
acknowledge that person involves another layer of judgment.  
Recognition as acknowledgment is a form that relates directly to questions of 
justice and injustice, and depending on how it is employed or withheld can have 
severe consequences. Identification and acknowledgment are not two distinctions 
without difference in the concept of recognition. Acknowledgment is where 
questions of moral standing, agency and justice begin to enter into any discussion of 
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recognition and what it might mean for broader concerns. An illustrative account of 
the first two types of recognition and how they relate to the questions mentioned 
above is provided by Onora O’Neill in her account of duties to distant strangers. She 
argues that if someone is treated as an agent or having agency, they are entitled to 
some degree of moral standing. (2000d :191-192). This entails identification as 
recognition, because when assumptions are made about a person’s behaviors, ideas 
and preferences those assumptions also indicate a larger assumption that a person 
has agency (O’Neill 2000d: 193).  These assumptions, however, are not always 
enough to elicit recognition as acknowledgement, and when that form of recognition 
is withheld from agents, the consequences can be severe. 
Notoriously some Nazis claimed that some of their victims lacked moral 
standing, that they were Untermenschen. Yet the Nazis’ actions reveal that 
they in fact assumed that those whom they persecuted were intelligent, 
foresighted, literate agents capable of complex mental and physical suffering. 
None of the organization of the deportations or of the camps makes sense 
except against these background assumptions. All the subterfuge, the 
bureaucratic formalities of deportation, the rhetoric of belittlement, the 
techniques of control make sense only on the assumption that the victims 
were indeed seen as intelligent agents and vulnerable subjects. (O’Neill, 
2000d :193-194).  
The significance of the distinction between identification and acknowledgment are 
demonstrated by this example. The Nazi’s showed that they recognized, in the sense 
of identification, that their victims had agency- that they were capable of feeling, 
planning, thinking, or acting- but they withheld acknowledgment of that agency. 
Withholding recognition as acknowledgment if a form of injustice, and it is a 
powerful and consequential move that provides a basis for perpetrating further 
injustices, as the above example demonstrates. Even though their victims were 
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identified as agents and people, they were not acknowledged as such, and that lack 
of acknowledgment allowed further abuses against their victims. In order to avoid 
such abuse, strong justifications must be offered for withholding recognition as 
acknowledgment from persons or things, because by refusing to acknowledge them, 
there is also an implicit refusal to acknowledge that harm may be done to that thing 
or person. “ [U]nless distinctive and weighty reasons to the contrary can be given in 
a particular case, agents will be committed to acknowledging the moral standing of 
those whom their action acknowledges as agents and subjects (2000d: 194).” 
 This example exposes a clear difference between recognition as 
acknowledgement and recognition as mere identification, and what the 
consequences of that may be. However, most cases are subtler than the injustices 
perpetrated by the Nazi’s. This subtlety is where the continuum of recognition as 
acknowledgment is introduced. A complete refusal to acknowledge something has 
obvious consequences, as illustrated above, but there are different levels of 
acknowledgement available besides outright denial and full embrace. Identification 
or consciousness of persons may not be possible to escape, but there are different 
degrees if acknowledgement. Tied to the discussion above about differences 
between communitarian and cosmopolitan thinkers, it is not only cosmopolitans 
who would acknowledge others both inside and outside of their own communities. 
Even if their recognition stopped well short of appreciation, a strict communitarian 
thinker would still acknowledge that outsiders exist and have some right to. Even 
though acknowledgement requires acceptance, acceptance does not mean 
celebration, and provided that someone did not demand the eradication of others 
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for no reason than that they belong to a different community, that acceptance exists. 
As noted above, there is also a range of positions taken in communitarian thought, 
and many would grant acknowledgment far beyond the minimal threshold of not 
wishing to destroy others for the mere sake of it. For example, even though a 
communitarian such as Alasdair MacIntyre strongly prioritizes members of his own 
community over others because of the belief “[t]hat a satisfactory life lies in being in 
a right relationship with a community (Brown, 1992: 58),” he does not deny their 
right to exist, and would presumably only wish that they did not in the event that 
the posed a threat to his own community (1995: 222). MacIntyre is a much more 
hard-line communitarian than others, and others may not even acknowledge 
members of their own communities to be distinctly more valuable than those 
outside of it, but rather that there are limitations to how we can treat people outside 
of our immediate communities. There are shades of acknowledgment here, from 
unequal, indifferent, positive, and with cosmopolitan thinking, the desire for equal 
acknowledgment for all.  
 As note of Erskine’s theory of embedded cosmopolitan above alluded to, 
there are differences in the spectrum of recognition for cosmopolitans as well.  A 
committed ethical cosmopolitanist might object that because Erskine’s theory 
claims that granting equal moral standing to people requires connection beyond just 
shared humanity, its moral purview is too limited. An ethical cosmopolitanist and 
someone who advocates embedded cosmopolitanism might both question the moral 
relevance inherent in physical boundaries and refuse “[t]o regard existing political 
structures as the source of ultimate value (Brown, 1992: 24).” However, a 
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cosmopolitan such as O’Neill would be more suspicious of any position that invests 
much importance in particularities, particularly at the expense of granting equal 
moral standing to all.  As evident from the above, she views withholding 
acknowledgment from people a form of injustice, and believes that establishing an 
inclusive worldwide community of humanity is a requirement of justice (2000d: 
196-197). Extending recognition and granting moral standing to everyone is part of 
the practical aspect of securing justice, and can provide a basis for actions to 
establish justice.  
 A potentially inescapable impasse develops in relation to recognition in light 
of disparities between communitarian and cosmopolitan thinkers on the subject of 
justice, which is closely tied to the issue of recognition, and what level of 
acknowledgment people are to be granted. As a further example of Dobson’s critique 
above that cosmopolitanism does not create impetus for action, here we see that 
while some committed ethical cosmopolitans call for equal recognition or all people 
regardless of community, there is no way to enforce that equal recognition as it 
relates to persons. While discussion between and amongst the variety of position 
holders on this issue will continue, the prospect of a consensus that leads to 
uniform, equal acknowledgment of persons seems unlikely. However, this does not 
bring the discussion of recognition, or its potential, to a close.  
 As mentioned above, there is a third stage of recognition, in the sense of 
appreciation or acclaim, which is more robust, enhanced form of recognition where 
an actor has now identified and strongly acknowledged something, and has also 
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come to value the object of that recognition. Concern and significance are greatly 
increased for things that we value, and these increases might be able to provide 
grounds for change. The act of recognition at this third stage promotes action 
beyond recognition. Actors may be driven to preserve, defend or fight for what they 
value. While it is possible for an individual actor to recognize others in the sense of 
appreciation or valuing them, as mentioned above, it is not the position here that 
such an extension of recognition is possible towards people to meaningfully effect 
widespread change alone. Instead, it is argued that recognition as appreciation can 
be extended to resources and conditions, particularly as they relate to the 
environment.  
 As discussed extensively above, our interactions have increased substantially 
to the point that we have the ability to impact each other significantly and without 
regard to physical distance. Theorists such as O’Neill have argued that extending 
recognition or equal moral standing is a part of a practical matter as it relates to 
establishing justice in these interactions and alleviating their consequences. 
However, not enough people are willing to extend recognition of everyone’s 
inherent value as a member of humanity to allow that to become a basis for action 
or change. In order to unlock the potential of recognition as appreciation for change, 
we must leave aside the question of extending recognition to people at present, and 
instead focus on extending recognition to the conditions and resources that enable 
us to live and interact. Appreciation of the means and conditions that enable life and 
interaction may lead us to reform our behavior n relation to the environment and 
our political and social interactions that impact on it. This recognition as 
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appreciation of means and condition, that also requires recognition as 
acknowledgment of the problem of harm detailed above. Because of our ability to 
harm each other and our environment across distances, if we are concerned about 
the harm that may be done to us, we must also be concerned about the harm that we 
do to others. Appreciating the means and conditions that enable life, and 
acknowledging harm that damages those means and conditions and makes us 
vulnerable may provide us with the motivation to work to establish just relations 
required to alleviate environmental harm, and change our behavior that inflicts that 
harm.  
 Part of how that recognition as appreciation for the means and conditions 
that might allow us to alleviate environmental degradation might come about can be 
found in the above discussion about the fusion or co-relationship between moral 
and strategic learning. If we learn the consequences of environmental degradation 
and the danger that strategic learning alone might represent in response to such a 
problem, we might also learn to appreciate the environment, or the means and 
conditions of life to the extent that we are able to act and think differently. By 
recognizing in the sense of appreciation means and conditions, rather than people, 
we may be able to focus attempts a re-conceptualizing political community so that 
the form is better able to address environmental degradation not on issues of 
identity and relationships between people within and across those communities, but 
on what is required to secure the means and conditions of life.  
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 There is potential for a loose political community based not identity, but on 
the recognition as appreciation of the means and conditions that are affected by 
environmental degradation. An overarching political community that addresses 
itself specifically to issues relating to environmental degradation, or who gets, what, 
when and how in terms of protecting the environment and its resources, while still 
allowing more particularized communities to be embedded within this larger, looser 
political community. If we are capable of imagining ourselves as part of 
communities with people based on shared identities, we may also be able to imagine 
ourselves as part of a world community based on a shared appreciation or value for 
the means and conditions that allow us to live and interact. The resources Anderson 
uses to explain the spread of political communities, such as media are still available 
to a community not based on place or territory, but on this third stage of 
recognition. People can communicate their shared interest in and appreciation of 
the environment, as well as their fear for it, to forge ties necessary for such an 
association. Such a community would not need to be defined by its boundaries, but 
by what its members appreciate in common, even if they differ in terms of identities 
and other interests. As with Anderson’s truth-language and religiously based 
universalized communities, people still have the particularities of their identity, 
such as location, vernacular languages, religions, and other pursuits, but their over 
arching relationship and loose sense of communion with each other is forged by 
their shared recognition of their environment and the problems that it faces, and 
that they in turn will face if they do not have some association for action.  
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II. Practice Makes Practice Grow 
This argument may seem somewhat improbably or unrealistic on the face of 
it. Part of the is arguably due to the issue of inevitability that surrounds our current 
conception of political community, however, it is transnational problems that 
continually bring us back to the questions of political community and how they 
might and must change to address a problem of the scale of environmental 
degradation, because that have been demonstrably unable to do so, and are 
theoretically incapable and unequipped to do so. Like others, Bartelson’s 
investigations into community and how world communities might be brought into 
being has been driven by issues of transnational harm, especially environmental 
degradation.  
[T]oday this leaves us with the task of reformulating our conceptions of 
community in light of our cosmological beliefs about the human habitat, 
rather than conversely. This is the philosophical import of problems of 
climate change in current cosmological beliefs about the role of mankind in 
the shaping of our habitat. If mankind is no longer separate from nature, we 
might as well reunite in the face of the Flood that threatens to diminish the 
habitability of our planet. But that very Flood is also what now promises to 
wash the maps of empire away for good (Bartelson, 2009: 181-182)” 
For many, reconsidering the shape of our communities is no longer optional in light 
of the problem that we face. While this may entail, as Bartelson suggest, a complete 
reconsideration of our cosmology, the argument here has been that if we are able to 
learn to extend enhanced recognition to the environment to the point that we would 
take action on a broad scale to preserve and defend the means and conditions that 
allow us to live and interact, that action might lead us to re-conceptualized political 
communities, where we can be in loose, universal association with each other, but 
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still retain our particularized, local identities. As O’Neill suggested above, we are 
already capable of holding multiple, overlapping identities in a variety of 
communities, this would take the additional step of being in an overlapping set of 
communities that is not predicated on the idea that communities must have 
boundaries, be exclusive, or that it is forged in opposition to an Other.  
 There is a final point of potential in a community imagined on the basis of 
recognition of means and conditions- the potential that it could also serve as the 
basis of communities that are also unbounded in character that eventually do 
extend recognition to people as a matter of justice, rather than just means and 
conditions. If there were such a political community based on loose association and 
recognition of means and conditions, it may further grow to influence how we 
approach other communities embedded within this larger, looser community. By 
engaging in different practices and ways of thinking, we may begin to grow those 
practices to the extent that they eventually become what seems inevitable or 
normal. Part of what Anderson’s work demonstrated was that there have been other 
ways of organizing or conceptualizing of political communities, meaning that other 
ways were still possible. It also illustrated how practices changed over time to reify 
and naturalize the form of political community that we think of now that is local, 
particular, territorially based, and limited. This was not, as shown above, inevitable. 
It involved choices, acceptance, and the imagining over time that is what political 
communities acted and functioned like. Media and communications could be put to 
use in a similar manner to normalize a new approach to political community (or 
new approaches, because it does not necessarily have to take only one form) that 
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views boundaries as instrumental rather than morally relevant, or celebrates both 
difference and sameness as the basis for different types and approaches to political 
community. 
 The more that we practice a loose sense of association or political 
community, the more that it may grow and the further it may go to alleviating the 
problem of environmental degradation. Such a loose political community that brings 
us into more just relations in regards to the environment by default may also 
influence other relations and associations. The goal of recognition as appreciation is 
not justice directly, but if an actor appreciates the means and conditions of life and 
interaction, they must also acknowledge that other actors can harm or impact those 
means and conditions. Unless all potential threatening actors can be controlled and 
subjugated, which it is argued here they effectively cannot, acknowledgement of the 
capabilities of others in tandem with appreciation of the means and conditions that 
facilitate life requires practices that foster co-existence and minimal harm. Such 
practices would have the byproduct of producing more just relations.  
Stanley Hoffman articulated the effect that practices can have over time in 
fostering and growing practices:  
[I} end up somewhat inevitably with the philosophically untidy and politically 
elastic notion, that the scope of our obligation to individuals in other societies 
varies in time and space. There was none of it perhaps sixty or fifty years ago 
(or rather, very few people acknowledged one). There is some now, more 
widely recognized. If all goes well, and statesmen, writers, and so on, press on, 
it may grow in the future (Hoffman, 1981: 157). 
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As something is practiced, it grows over time. Where once there was no recognized 
obligation to outsiders or other, eventually there developed the idea that there were 
such obligations, an idea that has only grown stronger and more widespread over 
time. As we practice recognition as appreciation for means and conditions or the 
environment, we grow that practice, and it may begin eventually to extend to other 
areas or people.  
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Conclusion 
Environmental degradation is growing global concern that has provided a 
sense of urgency to discussion related to the development of ideas such as 
cosmopolitan harm conventions and re-conceptualization of community. The 
current form of political community as it is closely aligned with sovereign states is 
inadequate to effectively addressing and alleviating the problem posed by 
transnational harms, particularly that of environmental degradation. The modern 
form of political community, and the understanding of communities more generally, 
have been imbued with a sense of inevitability that naturalizes contingencies and 
creates a barrier to considering alternative forms, practices, and ideas. By 
interrogating and exposing this false inevitability and the impact that it has, the path 
towards re-conceptualizing political community begins to clear. This does not mean 
that the current form of political community and the ideas the it encapsulate need to 
be completely dismantled, but that they must be opened up for reconsideration and 
change as necessary.  
By using Benedict Anderson’s work, that alternative possibilities for political 
communities have existed and therefore can exist was demonstrated. Anderson’s 
Imagined Communities also served as an integral part of the premise that political 
communities can shift from being political communities of place to political 
communities of recognition. While Anderson does take a territorialized view of 
modern political communities, his arguments about imagining communities across 
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distances and regardless of face-to-face interactions serve to illustrate how other 
conceptualizations of political community might grow and spread.  
Theorists such as Onora O’Neill and Jens Bartelson show that much of the 
flexibility needed to change entrenched understandings of what political 
communities are and how the function already exists or has existed, it just requires 
great motivational capacity, that can be found in the threat of environmental 
degradation, the potential of cosmopolitan harm conventions, the possibility of a 
combination of moral and strategic learning, and an enhanced form of recognition as 
appreciation that can be extended to things rather than people.  
Perhaps it will require catastrophe to move people to the action required to 
effectively address a problem on the scale of environmental degradation, but that is 
not inevitable. By confronting and exposing barriers to alternatives, and then by 
being willing to flexibly re-consider how and why things and people are organized 
the potential opens up for cooperation without devastation. The warning is already 
enough for some, and the more that potential solutions are explored, articulated and 
practiced the stronger they may grow.  
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